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Waste generation and landfill diversion dynamics:
decentralised management and spatial effects
An analysis of economic and policy transitions
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Abstract
This paper provides analyses of municipal waste generation and landfill diversion dynamics based on a 8-years panel 
dataset for Italy covering 103 provinces. Although absolute declining for waste generation is a long way off, there are some 
first signals of increasing relative delinking and robust average landfill diversion. Spatial effects seem to be negligible, 
probably due to the strong  decentralisation of waste management and policies: local,  economic, policy and structural 
factors contribute to explaining the waste dynamics. Though North-South waste performances are showing some signals 
of convergence, greater efforts towards convergence of waste performances in a decentralised policy scenario are needed.  
Keywords: waste  generation, waste management,  landfill  diversion,  decentralised  waste policies,  landfill tax, separated 
collection, spatial effects, convergence 
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1. Introduction
Indicators  of  ‘decoupling/delinking’  are  used  to  measure  improvements  in 
environmental/resource efficiency with respect to economic activity. The European Union’s (EU) 
‘thematic strategies’ on resources and waste, include reference to ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ delinking 
indicators (European  Commission, 2003a,b;  Jacobsen  et  al., 2004),  the  former being  a  negative 
relationship between economic growth and environmental impacts while the latter being a positive 
but  decreasing  in  size  relationship.  The  achievement  of  some  degree  delinking  is  of  prime 
importance for waste (Figure 1), given that the EU evidence (EEA, 2009) shows an absence of even 
relative delinking (for illustrative purposes see also Figure 2). The European Environmental Agency 
(EEA, 2007) acknowledges that volumes in the EU are growing, driven by changing production and 
consumption patterns (see also Andersen et al., 2007), and highlights (EEA, 2006) the importance of 
flexible  implementation  of  market-based  instruments,  within  a  decentralised  approach  to 
environmental  policy  in  the  EU,  to  achieve  a  stronger  degree  of  delinking  in  (regionally 
decentralised) waste indicators. Policy endogeneity and spatial phenomena are interrelated and are 
very important for achieving waste targets thorough effective (diffusion) of policies in the territory. 
In this paper we address these aspects as key elements in the assessment of delinking and policy 
effectiveness, which are intertwined in the decentralised policy settings typical of the EU and the 
US. Italy is a country with high levels of decentralisation in environmental policy making, which is 
moving towards an even  stronger federal set up; moreover it is characterised by major income 
differences between its northern and southern regions, and historically quite different economic and 
environmental performance. Divergence or convergence in current and future waste performances 
is a key  issue that is receiving renewed attention since the  collapse in 2008-2009, of the waste 
managements schemes (both practically and financially) in Naples and Palermo.
i This issue is of 
great interest given that on the one hand countries are monitored and valued on the basis of their 
national average performance, and on the other hand that regional system collapses are covered 4
financially by national taxes. Italy also may provide an interesting case study for informing policy 
and waste management schemes in other highly decentralised and heterogeneous environments
ii. 
Figure 1 : The income–environment relationship
Figure 2: Projected generation and landfilling of municipal waste in the EU25
  
Source: EEA (2007), Figures from 1980-2004 are data from Eurostat. Figures from 2005-2020 are projections. BMW 
(Bio degradable Municipal waste)
Theoretically, policy decentralisation may have a positive effect on waste generation via reduction 
and better waste management performance,  based  on greater flexibility and specificity in policy 
implementation, which may be able to take account of local idiosyncratic costs and benefits related 
to policy (Pearce, 2004). Although decentralisation may improve policy implementation in the EU, 
including policies for waste prevention, it may have some drawbacks in terms of exploitation of local 
rents by public and private agents. In principle, rents are neither good nor bad in the environmental 5
realm. What matters are their effects on static and dynamic elements such as value creation and 
innovation. Waste ‘markets’, such as land-filling and even recycling, may be associated with rents 
that could lock  a local  system in  to  less than  optimal  equilibrium. This  aspect requires  further 
research. 
The high heterogeneity of income and environmental performance makes it necessary to study the 
dynamic evolution of policy implementation and spatial dependence regarding the waste trends that 
emerge at regional and provincial levels. In this paper we focus on the provincial level, exploiting 
socio-economic and environmental data for a large number of provinces (103), over a fairly long 
dynamic path (8 years), from 1999 to 2006, where there has been drastic change in municipal waste 
policies and waste management.












The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, highlighting works 
that deal with delinking, policy effectiveness and spatial analyses. Section 3 presents the research 
hypotheses, the empirical model and the data source. Section 4 discusses the panel regression results 
for  waste  generation  and  landfill  diversion,  and  then  presents  the  tests  for  potential  spatial 
correlation.  Section  5  concludes,  offering  policy  recommendations  for  effective  decentralised 
management of waste. 
2. The relevant literature
Despite the environmental, policy and economic significance of waste issues, there is very little 
empirical evidence  on  delinking,  even  for  major  waste streams  such  as  the  municipal  one  and 
packaging. Analyses of policy effectiveness are similarly scarce. Existing work is largely oriented 
towards the optimisation of waste management or evaluation of externalities, regarding landfill and 7
other waste disposal strategies, with a very few purely theoretical analyses of waste management and 
landfill management (Calcott and Walls, 2005; Daskalopoulos et al., 1998; Andre and Cerda, 2004; 
Ozawa, 2005). The stronger focus on cost benefit analyses of specific waste streams and policy 
packages (Pearce, 2004), and landfill siting decisions aimed at resolving the NIMBY (not in my 
backyard) problem (Quah and Yong, 2007), in part is due to lack of reliable panel data, which is 
extremely scarce at sub-country level. 
Some macro level evidence, based on cross country regression analysis of data from the 1980s, is 
presented in World Bank (1992). More recent reports (DEFRA/DTI, 2003) provide evidence of 
positive elasticities between waste generation and income being of primary policy concern. Waste 
generation seems still to be characterised by a strict relationship between economic drivers and 
environmental pressures. 
A study by Cole et al. (1997) finds no evidence of an inverted U-shape in relation to municipal 
waste. Cole and colleagues use data on municipal waste for the period 1975-90, for 13 OECD 
countries; their findings revealed no turning point (TP), and they find environmental indicators 
(municipal  waste  generation)  monotonically  increasing  with  income  over  the  observed  range. 
Similarly, Seppala et al. (2001), in a study of five industrialised countries including Japan, the US and 
Germany, and covering a similar period (1970-1994), find no evidence of delinking regarding direct 
material flows too. However,  Fischer-Kowalski and Amann (2001),  analysing the richer  OECD 
countries, find that the intensity of material input with respect to GDP shows relative, but not 
absolute delinking, with material growth over 1975-1995 for all countries. They note that absolute 
delinking holds for landfilled waste, but not for waste generated.
There is some evidence of delinking. For example, Leigh (2004), which uses a waste/consumption 
indicator derived from the environmental sustainability indexes (ESI), and Berrens et al. (1998) and 
Wang et al. (1998), who find evidence of a negative elasticity for US stocks of hazardous waste as an 
environmental impact indicator, based on a county-based cross sectional dataset. 8
A study by Johnstone and Labonne (2004) uses panel data on solid waste in the OECD countries 
to provide evidence on the economic and demographic determinants of rates of household solid 
waste generation, regressed over consumption expenditure, urbanisation and population density. 
They find positive elasticities, but lower than 1, in the range 0.15 to 0.69. Few studies include waste 
policy  analyses.  The  study  by  Karousakis  (2006), which  deals  with  policy  evaluation,  presents 
evidence on the determinants of waste generation and the driving forces behind the proportions of 
paper/glass recycled, and the proportion of waste that goes to land-fill. She finds for OECD that 
municipal solid waste (MSW) increases monotonically with income and that urbanisation exerts an 
even stronger effect on waste generation, while the time-invariant policy index is not significant. At 
country level, Mazzanti et al (2008) analyze waste generation dynamics, showing that only the richest 
provinces are close to a turning point in the waste income relationship, with strong north south gaps 
and an effective role of waste management systems like tariffs, which are nevertheless associated to 
endogeneity with respect to income.
Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009), based on panel data for a group of European countries, finds also 
neither absolute nor relative delinking, for municipal or packaging waste for 1995-2000 and 1997-
2000 respectively. Estimated elasticities of waste generation with respect to household consumption 
are close to unity. 
In terms of the main landfill oriented works, the focus, as already indicated, has been on cost-
benefit analyses and landfill siting decisions, due in part to the lack of reliable country level and 
within  country  data  (Pearce,  2004).  Some  scholars  have  attempted  to  evaluate  the  EU  landfill 
Directive and the implementation in the UK of a landfill tax in 1996. Some of this work is informed 
by a  specific  evaluation  of  the  externalities. Given  the  lack  of  hard  data,  these  studies present 
interesting  but  only  qualitative  assessments.  During  the  first  phase  of  the  UK  landfill  tax 
implementation,  Morris  et  al.  (1998)  investigated  its  potential  contribution  to  sustainable  waste 
management, analysing  its  general  structure,  comparative  landfill  costs and  the  waste  hierarchy. 
Morris and Read (2001), Burnley (2001), Davies and Doble (2004) provide additional qualitative 9
evidence. Phillips et al. (2007) is a UK specific regional assessment of waste strategies, but regional 
based analyses are still rare. 
The works discussed above sometimes touch on the spatial (dependence) factors that may impact 
on environmental performance spatial phenomena, have been prominent in analyses of waste siting 
(Jenkins et al., 2004; Miranda et al., 2000; Ley et al., 2002). This rather specific stream of waste-
related works includes studies of mainly Scandinavian and UK experience, due mostly to the lack of 
data for most countries. Hage et al. (2008) investigate the main drivers of rates of collection of 
household plastic packaging waste in certain Swedish municipalities, using spatial econometrics for a 
cross  section  of  282  units.  They  find  that  spatial  issues  (collection  is  positively  correlated  for 
neighbouring municipalities) and policy levers (weight based waste fees), are relevant (see also Hage 
et al., 2009; Hage 2008). Our analysis is much more general; it focuses on an entire country and 103 
provinces rather than a sample of municipalities, and covers a quite long period. This enables better 
integration of economic, environmental, policy and spatial issues in a more dynamic scenario.
The literature on waste determinants referred to above, underlines that waste indicators generally 
tend to increase with income or other economic drivers such as population, and that, in general, full 
delinking is not supported by the data. A decreasing trend (negative elasticity) may be found in 
industrialised countries where waste management and policies are more developed. Nevertheless, the 
risk is that bell shapes (absolute delinking) are associated with only a few rich countries or areas, and 
can be divisive in terms of countries’ waste performance indicators (Mazzanti and Montini, 2009). 
3.  Research hypotheses and data sources
In order to embed waste generation and landfill diversion dynamics in socio-economic, geographic 
and policy  regional contexts we exploit  a rich vector  of explanatory variables  that enhance the 
conceptual model that is used for applied investigations of delinking (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004, 
2008; Cole at al., 1997). We here summarise the hypotheses with respect to landfill diversion and 10
waste generation in terms of the expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and 
offer a descriptive sketch of the variables. 
First,  we  verify  delinking  and  the  eventual  non-linearity  (bell  shape)  in  the  income-waste 
relationship.  For  waste  generation,  we  expect  either  a  linear  relationship  with  eventual  relative 
delinking, or a (to our knowledge never found) a reasonable TP. In the case of landfill diversion, 
since in  the EU and Italy a decreasing trend started in 1995-1997, we expect either  a negative 
relationship, or a U shape if performance has deteriorated.  
Second,  we  examine  the  expected  effects  of  socio-economic  and  structural  variables,  mainly 
population density and tourist flows. Population density may be negatively or positively linked to 
waste generation. We would expect to find the latter effect, especially based on the findings in the 
literature. In more densely populated areas, only economies of scale spurred by urbanisation could 
invert this trend and reduce waste generation. Regarding landfill diversion, we definitely expect a 
negative  linking,  on  the  basis  of  the  studies  reviewed  above,  and  on  the  joint  role  of  higher 
economic opportunity costs of land and harsher environmental externalities in urban areas. Tourist 
flows per capita are a nice structural control for countries like Italy. Waste generation could be 
spurred by tourist flows. However, we could also expect that in the most popular tourist areas, 
diversion might be driven down in favour of incineration or recycling for the same reasons as in the 
case of population density, that is, high local economic and environmental opportunity costs.
Third, we check the role of decentralised policy-related variables. In both cases (waste generation 
and  landfill  diversion),  we  expect  policy  variables  to  drive  down  the  income-environment 
relationship.  Recent  work  shows  that  policy  endogeneity  with  respect  to  income  needs  to  be 
considered and could lead – at least in the short run - to a positive correlation between policy 
stringency and  waste performance,  mediated by  income. The  waste management/policy  proxies 
considered are: (a) share of separately collected waste, which we consider to be a policy element 
associated with waste management; (b) share of provincial municipalities and provincial population 
affected by the new ‘waste tariff’ regime, which replaces the previous ‘waste tax’ regime.
iii The tariff 11
should  move  waste  management  towards  full-cost  pricing/polluter  pays  principle  (PPP)  based 
system;
iv (c)  percentage  of  waste  management  costs  covered  by  the  tariff;  and  (d)  main 
environmental tax in the waste realm, the landfill tax, implemented at regional level in Italy. 
Fourth, in the landfill diversion analyses we control for provincial ‘investment choices’ in landfill 
and incineration, by including incinerated waste per capita and number of landfill sites per area 
(km
2), and number of incineration plants per area (km
2). We aim to test for the existence of lock in 
dynamic effects when a province decides to invest in a single main disposal option. 
Finally,  we  implement  a  proper  spatial  analysis  to  test  for  the  spatial  autocorrelation  of  waste 
generation and landfill diversion at provincial level, by setting up contiguity and distance weight 
matrixes (see Section 4.2). We investigate three short time periods (1999-2000, 2002-2003 and 2005-
2006], to verify whether spatial correlation is relevant and if its eventual presence and effect on 
waste drivers has changed over time. This test has some methodological and policy implications. 
The absence of a clear spatial correlation could be interpreted as lack of policy cooperation within a 
regional area with similar income levels, with single provinces behaving independently as far as waste 
policy implementation is concerned. This evidence should be taken in conjunction with evidence on 
the performance of the entire system and that of regional subsystems, since spatially correlated 
performance data are not preferable to non-correlated performance data.  12
Table 1: Descriptive analysis and research hypothesis
Acronym Variable description Mean Min Max Research hypothesis
MSW-GEN MSW  yearly  generated 
(kg per capita) 520.28 251.91 893.24 Dependent variable
LAND-
WASTE
MSW  yearly  generated 
and  landfilled  (kg  per 
capita)
325.4 0 1898.47 Dependent variable 
VA
Provincial  yearly  value 
added  per  capita 
(€2000)
17,718.22 9,369.12 28,796.07
Positively  correlated  with  income, 
the  objective  is  assessing  whether 
relative  or  absolute  delinking  is 
present
DENSITY Population/surface 
(inhabitants/km2) 244.76 22.99 2,640.92
Positive  and  negative  correlations 
may  emerge  depending  on  factors 
such  as  economies  of  scale  and  




Share  of  separated 
collection (%) 19.32 0.03 67.57 Negatively affecting landfilled waste 
per capita
TOURISM Annual  touristic 
presence 3,337,308 91,033 3,200,000
Positively affecting MSW generated 
Negatively affecting landfilled waste 
per capita
TAR-POP
Share  of  population 
living  in  municipalities 
that introduced a waste 
tariff  substituting  the 
former waste tax (%)
10.53 0 101.72 Possibly reducing MSW generation 
through  indirect feed back effects, 
though the direct effect is at waste 
management  level.  Possible 
endogeneity  given  the  positive 
correlation with respect to income. TAR-MUN
Share  of  municipalities 
that introduced a waste 
tariff  substituting  the 
former  waste tax (%)
6.01 0 100
INCper AREA Number incinerator 









MSW yearly incinerated 




Regional  Landfill  Tax 
(€/kg) 0.01 0.005 0.02
Possibly reducing MSW generation, 
incrementing  the  relative  cost  of 
landfilling.
NORD Dummy,  =1  if  the 
province is in the North 0.44 0 1
Different areas of the country show 
very different economic and 
institutional performance. These 
differences may be reflected in 
different amounts of waste 
generated and landfilled.
ISLAND
Dummy,  =1  if  the 
province  is  in  the 
Islands  (Sicily  and 
Sardinia)
0.12 0 1
SOUTH Dummy,  =1  if  the 
province is in the South 0.18 0 1
The  data  are  derived  from  the  rich  regional/provincial  information  available  from  the  Italian 
Environment Agency’s waste reports (APAT, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), produced 
according to Eurostat and EEA guidelines. 13
The APAT dataset includes data on MSW generated and landfilled in all the Italian Provinces (103 
distributed over 20 regions) and covers the period 1999-2006. It also provides information on waste 
tariff diffusion, landfill taxes and separated collection. We merge these data with official data on 
provincial level economic and other drivers. Although consumption is often used as a driver in 
analyses of waste trends (Andersen et al., 2007), we have only regional not provincial level data on 
consumption; thus, value added is the only reliable economic driver available. Finally, other socio 
economic factors are derived from national and regional official datasets available from the Italian 
statistical agency (ISTAT). Merging of all these data produces a fully balanced panel of 8 years and 
824 observations, that  as  far as we  know  possess great value  at  international level  for  variable 
richness, cross province heterogeneity, and dynamic extension. 
4. The model and empirical evidence 
After  discussion  of  the  model,  we  comment  on  the  empirical  evidence  addressing  first  waste 
generation (4.1) and landfill diversion drivers (4.2), and second investigating the relevance and nature 
of  spatial  phenomena  (4.3).  Finally  (4.4),  we  present  a  convergence  analysis  aimed  at  showing 
whether Italy although showing drastically different waste performance in the south and weak signs 
of spatial correlation, is characterised by a catching up of the poorer less performing regions.  
We estimate a model by  specifying the following  general panel based reduced form. Given the 
nature of data (and Hausman test outcomes - not shown), we opt for fixed effect LSDV (least 
square dummy variable) estimations which account for individual fixed effects by including N-1 
dummies. Linking to the comments above, we tackle the potential endogenous nature of waste 
management factors, depending on simultaneity and ‘measurement errors’
v of some variables, by 
lagging or instrumenting. 
(1) Log(MSW-GEN per capita) or LAND-WASTE per capita = αt + β1log (value added per capita)it + 
β2log(structural  factors)it + β3log(environmental policy factors) it + β4(other factors) it + εit14
The  (vector  of)  coefficient(s)  β2,  refers  to  factors  that  are  added  to  the  core  specification  and 
possible additional drivers of waste generation, such as population density and tourist flows. We add 
each variable separately to the core specification, which includes value added and population density. 
β3 refers to waste policies tested in the analysis, that are in logarithmic forms when it is possible.
vi
4.1. Waste generation drivers
In order to take account of the presence of heteroschedasticity and temporal correlation among 
individual drivers, we further cluster-corrected the traditional fixed effects LSDV.
vii These results are 
presented  in  Table  2  below.
viii First,  the  core  income-waste  relationship  appears  to  be  linearly 
shaped.
ix This evidence confirms the scientific evidence and the findings of institutional reports that 
reducing waste generation is a major challenge. Even a decade of waste (management) policies has 
not drastically affected the relationship. Nevertheless, we note that the elasticity is well below unity. 
Relative delinking, then, is present, which is an improvement on the unitary elasticity that many –
somewhat older - works highlight. Product eco-innovations, environmental household behaviour 
and waste management actions may be responsible for this change from delinking into the current 
relative  delinking.  The  other  key  driver,  population  density,  has  the  expected  positive  sign, 
confirming other evidence for the EU (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009): economies of scale in waste 
management do not exert potential impacts in densely urbanised areas. Even tourist flows, the other 
structural  factor,  show  the  expected  positive  sign.  Touristic  provinces  plausibly  face  stronger 
challenges and possibly need differentiated financing schemes and stricter waste management and 
disposal policy.
x
Second, we add to the core specification the main waste management/policy factors for which we 
have sufficient data. We note that the inclusion of additional covariates does not affect income and 
population density elasticities. Of these (separated collection, diffusion of waste tariffs, landfill tax), 
only separated collection is statistically significant. Waste tariffs show a weaker significance overall 15
and are partially model dependent, while landfill tax is not (TAR-POP is significant, TAR-MUN is 
not). The latter results are expected given the distance between the instrument, the landfill tax, and 
the target (waste generation), as noted by EEA (2009). The positive coefficients related to separate 
collection  and  waste  tariffs  recall  the  endogeneity  issue,  and  the  fact  that  policy  actions  and 
commitment at local level can be partially explained by local institutional and economic factors. 
Certain  some  institutional  local  factors  unfortunately  are  not  observable  (e.g.  environmental 
activism, social capital, political stability, and green party turnovers).
xi However, income can be a 
policy driver in a dynamic setting where environmental quality is a luxury and local public agents are 
challenged by stronger environmental preferences and have more resources (taxes) to invest in waste 
management. Nevertheless, it is evident that this result is a coherent with the fact that policy efforts 
are directed towards achieving better waste management rather than reducing waste at source. All 
EU and national targets have been set in terms of recovery and recycling, given the amount of 
waste, and only in the new 2008 waste framework directive timid signals of waste generation targets 
are proposed for future years (EEA, 2009).  
      Finally, we present the econometric exercises to cope with endogeneity. We deal with SEP-
COLLEC,  TAR-POP  and  TAR-MUN  in  different  ways:  lagging  one  year,  instrumenting  the 
covariate with VA or the first lag of the same variable (the regressions results are presented in Table 
A.1 in the appendix). Across the three cases, the evidence for SEP-COLLECT and TAR-POP is 
stable: the coefficients are highly significant with  positive signs.
xii TAR-MUN is significant only 
when its instrument is VA. We can say that our basic evidence is fairly robust. 
4.2 Landfill diversion drivers
We comment on the main evidence from the model that specifies the dependent variable – waste 
landfilled per capita - in non-log form.
xiii Table 3, following the reasoning mentioned above, presents 
the results of the fixed effect LSDV estimations with cluster correction. As in the case of waste 
generation, the relationship with income is linear, but with the expected negative sign. Population 16
density, confirming as noted above other evidence for the EU, is linked to a negative and very 
significant coefficient.
xiv In our view, this is a structural factor that recalls economic rationales: the 
significance  of  density  and  urban  population,  which  above  are  positively  correlated  to  waste 
generation, is as expected, and shows that where opportunity costs are higher (in urban, and densely 
populated  areas)  and  disamenities/external  effects  influence  more  people,  landfill  diversion  is 
stronger. For example, in situations where the value of land is especially high and population density 
is reaching world peaks, such as in Asia, landfill studies proliferate (Lang, 2005, Ozawa, 2005). Also, 
anecdotal evidence shows that Milan closed its landfill in 2003 for reasons related to environmental 
externalities and because of the very high economic opportunity costs deriving from the constraints 
to land development stemming from the presence of a landfill site. Such factors could explain the 
degree  of  delinking  and  landfill  diversion  in  the  endogenous  scenario,  even  without  policy 
interventions. Economic rents may lead either to bad situations (Mafia manages illegal landfill sites 
and thus is interested in maintaining a landfill based disposal system), or drive landfill diversion 
(legal  market  rents  linked  to  alternative  developments).  Economic  development  and  legal  rent 
creation is thus another lever exploitable by public policy use at local level. The only unexpected 
result  is  the  non-significance  of  tourism  in  explaining the  reduction  of  landfilled  waste.  One 
hypothesis  is  that  DENSITY  probably  captures  much  of  the  geographical  heterogeneity,  since 
‘regional dummies’ are not significant. 
The  evidence  related  to  waste  management/policy  covariates  is  interesting.  SEP-COLLECT  is 
significant with an associated negative coefficient, and TAR-POP and TAR-MUN are significant 
drivers of landfill diversion - the first showing a higher statistical significance: it is more effective at 
provincial level at capturing population, since it focuses on more heavily populated areas, rather than 
spreading the policy across all the municipalities involved. It is probably to be expected that urban 
areas matter more for waste performance. Further works on this issue would be useful given the 
transitional situation in the change from a tax to a tariff system.17
To sum up, the quite heterogeneous performance (between the North and South, and within the 
North and South areas) we observe in Italy, based on the evidence from our analysis, depends on 
economic-structural  (VA;  DENSITY)  and  waste  management  policy-related  factors.  Given  the 
strong  decentralisation  and  idiosyncratic  local  nature  of  both  economic  and  policy  features,  it 
follows that waste performance is driven by elements operating at a very decentralised level, some 
exogenous (DENSITY), others quite heavily influenced by local policy priorities and socio-political 
preferences. This could explain the differences between North and South and across provinces in 
areas of northern and southern Italy with similar levels of income.
Ultimately, we show that landfill tax is not effective, although this may depend on the time invariant 
nature of our information, which is a minor flaw given that the tax is adjusted not yearly, but every 
4-5 years. Not also that the not significant impact of landfill tax may be due not to its quite recent 
implementation (the tax was formally introduced in 1996), but to its relatively low level compared to 
other  EU  countries,  and  to  ‘weak  enforcement’  and  slack  implementation  in  some  regions.
xv
Nevertheless, even in the EU leading countries, such as the UK, some authors are doubtful about 
the  effectiveness  of  this  instrument  (Martin  and  Scott,  2003).  Policy  effectiveness  in  the 
environmental and even more in the waste area, depends on the structure of the policy package 
rather than on the individual instrument (EEA, 2009).
In terms of landfill diversion we investigate whether provinces that invest in the main alternative 
disposal  route,  incineration,  which  may  be  more  socially  beneficial  under  some  circumstances 
(Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2004), show stronger landfill diversion. Using information on incinerated 
waste per capita, we find a negative and significant effect on the amount of waste going to landfill. 
Incinerating activity, where present, seems to be able to promote landfill diversion.
The  Appendix  includes  a  further  robustness  check  for  potential  endogeneity.  Across  the  three 
considered cases, SEP-COLLECT and TAR-MUN are significant, while TAR-POP is generally only 
slightly significant (see Table A2).18
Table 2: Waste Generated - drivers
Variables
Waste Generated – Log Log Model – Cluster correction
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CONSTANT -0.9826795 -1.239424 3.926287*** -0.4126362 -0.7466809 1.645581*** 0.8638574*
VA 0.5378776*** 0.4799152*** /2 0.5084183*** 0.5250006*** 0.4584976*** 0.5291237***










N 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
Model3 FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM REM4 REM
Signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.
                                                
2 Not included given that the correlation between VA and COLLECT is 0.77
3In fixed effects models all the individual effects are significant. F test not shown.
4 Since landfill tax is a time invariant model a random effects model was used.19
Table 3: Waste Landfilled - drivers
Variables
Landfilled Waste – Lin Log Model – Cluster Correction
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CONSTAN
T 7524*** 7495.396*** 4477.85*** 5987.921*** 5834.446*** 3092.827*** 7598.889*** 3131.948*** 7271.041***
VA -333.98** -340.5877** Not incl for 
collinearity -254.5681** -241.760** -244.3936*** -339.7764** -262.028*** -301.2105***















N 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824
Model5 FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM REM6 FEM REM FEM
Signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.
                                                
5 In fixed effects models all individual effects are significant. F test not shown.
6 Since landfill tax is a time invariant model a random effects model was used.20
4.3 Spatial analysis
Spatial econometric analysis of the main determinants of waste generation and waste disposal is 
important if it can be argued that neighbouring provinces will exchange experience and, in this way, 
influence each other’s policies and waste management behaviour. From an econometric point of 
view,  if  such  spatial  interactions  exist  ordinary  least  square  (OLS)  methods  produce  parameter 
estimates  that  are  biased  and  inefficient  and  OLS  regression  models  need  to  be  replaced  with 
opportune spatial regression models.
Thus, we analyse and test spatial autocorrelation in Italian per capita landfilled waste and per capita 
waste generation using yearly provincial values. The literal meaning of spatial autocorrelation is self-
correlation  (autocorrelation)  of  the  observed  values  of  a  single  attribute,  according  to  the 
geographical (spatial) ordering of these values
xvi.
There are two kinds of spatial autocorrelation: positive, when the relationship between the value at a 
location and the values of its neighbours is positive; or negative when the relationship is negative. 
One class of spatial autocorrelation measures is given by Moran statistics.
xvii Spatial autocorrelation 
measures, such as Moran’s I, require a weights matrix that defines a local neighbourhood around 
each geographic unit. The value at each unit is compared with the weighted average of the values of 
its neighbours. Substantially, a weights file identifies the neighbours.
Weights can be constructed based on contiguity to the polygon boundary (shape) files, or calculated 
from the distance between points (points in a point shape file or centroids of polygons)
xviii. Formally, 
the spatial weights matrix is an n x n positive matrix (W) which specifies “neighbourhood sets” for 
each  observation.  In  each  row  i,  a  non-zero  element  wij defines  j as  being  a  neighbour
xix of  i. 
According to convention, an observation is not a neighbour to itself, so that the diagonal elements 
are zero (wii = 0) (Anselin, 2002). 
A second type of problem occurs when the spatial weights are based on a distance criterion, such that 
two units i and j are defined as neighbours when the distance between them (or, for units of area 
units, the distance between their centroids) is less than a given critical value. When there is a high 21
degree of heterogeneity in the spatial distribution of points or in the areas of regions, there may be 
no satisfactory critical distance. In those instances, a “small” distance will tend to yield a lot of 
islands (or, unconnected observations). Also, a distance chosen to ensure that each unit has at least 
one neighbour may result in an unacceptably large number of neighbours for the smaller units. A 
common solution to this problem could be to constrain the neighbour structure to the k-nearest 
neighbours,  thereby  precluding  islands  and  forcing  each  unit  to  have  the  same  number  of 
neighbours (Anselin, 2002). 
A third issue may arise when the weights are based on “economic” distance or another general metric, 
such as derived from a social network structure. Care must be taken to ensure that the resulting 
weights are meaningful, finite and non-negative. In addition, the “zero-distance problem” must be 
accounted for. This problem occurs when a distance measure, such as dij = |zi . zj |, becomes zero, 
due to rounding problems or because two observations show identical socio-economic profiles. As a 
result, inverse distance weights such as wij = 1/dij, are undefined.
Because it is also important to maintain the weights matrix as exogenous,
xx in our analysis we do not 
consider a weights matrix based on “economic” distance; thus we use: (i) a contiguity matrix (queen, 
1
st order); and (ii)  a proximity  matrix based  on the  distance between  centroids (with minimum 
threshold distance to ensure that each province has at least one neighbour).
Empirical results, according to the global Moran’s I statistic, suggest that the landfilling of MSW is 
not strongly related to landfilling in neighbouring municipalities. Only for the years 1999, 2000 and 
2006 (Table 4) the global Moran’s I statistic is slightly significant, but the ambivalent signs for those 
three years and across the interval considered, suggest that there is not a definite and significant 
spatial pattern. Moreover, the empirical results are not invariant with respect to the weight matrix 
used. In fact spatial autocorrelation for landfilled waste and the three years referred to above occurs 
if we consider only one of the weight matrixes (contiguity or proximity). 22
Table 4. Moran’s I for landfilled waste and waste generation for several years (p-values in brackets)
Moran’s I (contiguity matrix, 
Queen)
Moran’s I (proximity matrix, 
Euclidean distance)
Landfilled waste1999 0.0845* (0.0910) 0.0057 (0.4360)
Landfilled waste 2000 -0.0085 (0.5170) -0.1029* (0.0860)
Landfilled waste 2002 -0.0340 (0.3840) -0.0550 (0.2840)
Landfilled waste 2003 0.0229 (0.2970) -0.0155 (0.4890)
Landfilled waste 2005 -0.0390 (0.3360) -0.0183 (0.4660)
Landfilled waste 2006 0.0828* (0.0930) 0.0372 (0.2320)
Waste generation 1999 0.9361*** (0.0010) 0.9279***(0.0010)
Waste generation 2000 0.0189 (0.3120) 0.0535 (0.1850)
Waste generation 2002 0.0629 (0.1310) 0.0627 (0.1610)
Waste generation 2003 0.0582 (0.1490) 0.0576 (0.1460)
Waste generation 2005 0.1332** (0.0230) 0.1035* (0.0560)
Waste generation 2006 0.0008 (0.4240) 0.0097 (0.3980)
When we consider waste generation, we find a positive autocorrelation for 1999 and 2005, which is 
nevertheless more significant (and invariant with respect to the weight matrix) with respect to the 
case of landfilled waste. However, the other years do not present spatial dependence, although the 
signs are always positive. The positive spatial autocorrelation in the case of waste generation for 
1999  and  2005,  and  the  general  absence  of  spatial  autocorrelation  for  landfilled  waste,  can  be 
explored in the context of the map of the local clusters. A local indicators of spatial association 
(LISA) cluster map indicates significant cases and types of spatial association based on the LISA, 
which shows high-high (red) and low-low (dark blue) clusters (i.e. positive spatial autocorrelation) 
and  high-low  (bright  orange)  and  low-high  (blue)  clusters  (i.e.  negative  spatial  autocorrelation). 
Figures 5 and 6 show the respective LISA cluster maps for landfilled waste and waste generation. 
Figure 6 shows two very big clusters located in the North and in the South of Italy, which explain 
the strong positive spatial autocorrelation in 1999 for waste generation. A percentile map for waste 
generation in 1999 confirms this (Figure 7).
A possible interpretation of the substantial lack of the spatial autocorrelation in landfilled waste 
could be that the policy definition and implementation
xxi of landfilling has effectively happened at a 
very decentralised level, maybe even at the sub-provincial municipal level. It is provinces not regions 23
that  ultimately  have  to  manage  the  waste,  often  in  very  flexible  ways,  and  via  delegation  to 
municipalities or consortia of municipalities within the provinces. This could explain why there are 
no relevant spatial clustering phenomena in the landfilled waste data: policy decentralisation is very
high for both waste tariffs and effective implementation of landfill tax. We arrive at a somewhat 
different  conclusion  based  on  the  spatial  analysis  of  waste  generation.  Starting  from  an  initial 
situation,  the  1999  case,  with  strong  positive  spatial  dependence,  the  following  years  (with  the 
exception of 2002) present a substantial absence of spatial autocorrelation, which could be related to 
a spatial progressive homogenisation in per capita waste generation. Spatial analyses of waste are 
quite rare. We believe that the recent find of significant spatial correlation for the UK (Ham, 2009) 
regarding recycling rates is related to the different level of analysis - UK local authorities (388). We 
cannot conduct analyses at the same level due to data unavailability, but we can assume that the 
higher the level of decentralisation analysed, the more likely spatial correlations will arise. From a 
policy  perspective,  both  province  and  municipality  levels  are  of  interest,  as  they  represent 
governance at the various levels and vary across regions. What we find is that the current de facto
situation,  which  originated  in  the  evolution  of  this  complex  decentralised  waste  system,  is 
characterised  by  provinces  acting  as  the  ‘waste  economic-policy  jurisdiction’,  with  eventual 
homogeneity of actions and performance within provinces. Whether this ‘positive’ empirical fact fits 
with the normative elements related to efficiency is a matter for further research, which should 
analyse local costs and benefits for this environmental local public good, and economies of scale, in 
the spirit of Oates and Buchanan’s models of optimal decentralisation of local public/club goods.    24
Figure 5. LISA (local indicators of spatial association) cluster maps for per capita landfilled waste (1999 and 2006)
Figure 6. LISA (local indicators of spatial association) cluster maps for per capita waste generation (1999 and 2006)25
Figure 7. Percentile maps for per capita waste generation (1999 and 2006)26
4.4 Convergence 
We carry next to examine convergence in waste generation and landfill diversion trends. This is an 
instrumental exercise aimed at assessing whether at least the different performance in the northern 
and southern regions, a hot issue for Italy and other federal states in the EU, is showing some 
convergence. The topic of convergence is seldom applied to the waste realm, although the UK study 
by Ham (2009) brings together spatial and convergence analyses. She finds that, as far as recycling 
rates are concerned, in a quite similar environment characterised by regional disparities, there are 
both convergence and spatial effects. Interest in convergence studies is increasing due to increased 
interest in the field of environmental economics, especially in relation to air polluting emissions.
Among these studies, List (1999) performs convergence tests on a long panel dataset of sulphur 
dioxides and nitrogen oxide emissions in the US, and finds evidence of convergence. Strazicich and 
List (2003) using data on carbon dioxide emissions in 21 OECD countries, find strong and robust 
evidence of convergence. Aldy (2006) performs a series of tests on carbon dioxide emissions in 
period 1960-2000 in two different samples, a 23 OECD country sample and a wider 88 world 
country  dataset.  He  finds  significant  convergence  for  the  OECD  sample,  but  insignificant 
convergence for the other sample. Barassi et al. (2007), perform a series of advanced panel root unit 
tests  on  a  sample  of  OECD  countries  for  the  period  1950-2002  but  find  no  evidence  of 
convergence in the amount of carbon dioxide produced per capita. In all these studies, the concept 
of  convergence  adopted  is  taken  from  the  more  traditional  analyses  of  income  convergence 
originally introduced by growth economists (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 2003). The more usual test 
in this field, know as β-convergence, refers to what is generally called absolute convergence, and is 
aimed  at  checking  whether  the  poor  countries  are  “catching  up”  with  the  richer  ones.  In  the 
emissions  context  this  means  checking  whether  the  pattern  of  emissions  in  the  less-polluting 
countries is increasing more quickly than in other countries. If so, we can say that emissions are 
converging  to  the  same  level  among  countries.  If  not,  then  the  rate of  emissions  in  the  more 27
polluting countries would be increasing. Such analyses are common in emissions studies because of 
the implication of their findings for climate change policy makers and modellers of climate change. 
In our case a series of convergence test should provide a deeper understanding of the waste 
sector. We have seen that, for the whole of Italy, there is an overall trend in waste management 
characterised by a process of relative delinking for waste generation and absolute delinking for total 
waste landfilled. In this context of a major regulatory change, a convergence test should help to 
understand how the process is developing and whether the reorganization of waste management in 
Italy is producing greater convergence or is widening the differences among provinces. In particular 
it will show whether amounts of waste generated are increasing, and whether the growth in different 
areas is converging or whether more the amounts of waste in waste-intensive provinces are growing 
more quickly. Furthermore, testing for the amount of waste landfilled should tell us whether the 
process of  landfill  diversion  over  the  last  decade  is  being  driven  by  a  few  big  provinces or  is 
occurring across the whole country. 
In order to test for convergence in our panel, we estimate a regression where the dependent 
variable is given by the variation in the growth of our log dependent variable against the lagged 
variable itself. This allows us to test whether the rate of change of the variable at time t depends by 
its previous value. In other words, a significant and negative coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable means that we are in the presence of convergence. Furthermore, in order to avoid problems 
of endogeneity based on the nature of the regression, the lagged dependent variable is instrumented 
with the lag for the previous year.
xxii The specification is shown below and the regression results are 
summarised in Table 5.
(2) log wasteit – log wasteit-1 = αit + β log wasteit-1 + εi28
Table 5: Convergence, Waste generation and landfilled Waste
Waste Generated Waste Landfilled
l.MSW-GEN -0.3920663***     
l.LAND-WASTE -0.6080219***
CONSTANT Not present/estimated 3.405887***
MODEL IV FEM (cluster correction) FEM (cluster correction)
Davidson-MacKinnon test 0.0158 0.5457
From a methodological point of view, both the previous regressions were estimated using a fixed 
effect model with cluster correction for heteroskedasticity. Moreover, based on the results of the 
Davidson-MacKinnon test for exogeneity, we preferred an OLS estimator of the same equation for 
the waste landfilled analysis. 
The two analyses show similar results: the coefficients - significant and with a negative sign -
prove the presence of convergence in both cases. The only important difference is in the value of 
the coefficient, which can be interpreted as the speed of convergence. This difference tells us that 
the process of convergence is occurring more quickly for landfill diversion. This is a positive signal, 
and to some extent mitigates the current dramatic difference between southern and northern regions 
in terms of average waste management and waste disposal performance, although local problem in 
Naples  and Sicily  remain.  Nevertheless,  the  existence  of  a gap,  even  if  consistent  in  part  with 
different  socio-economic  conditions,  highlights  the  need  for  great  attention  to  achieving 
convergence of waste performances in the current transition towards a more decentralised policy 
scenario.     
5. Conclusions
Waste disposal is becoming increasingly problematic and important in policy terms in the EU, and 
especially in Italy given this country’s high policy decentralisation and wide structural difference in 
terms  of  income  between  southern  and  northern  regions.  This  paper  analyses  the  process  of 
delinking in waste generation and landfilled waste trends through the consideration of economic, 
structural, policy and spatial factors. 29
The  analysis  of  the core  income-waste  generation  relationship  do  not  support  the  evidence  of 
negative  elasticity,  even  at  higher  income  levels.  Despite  the  fact  that  even  a  decade  of  waste 
(management) policy has not affected the relationship in a substantial way, we take it to be a positive 
sign  that  elasticity  is  below  unity,  which  points  to  the  presence  of  at  least  relative  delinking.
Moreover,  population  density drives  up  waste  generation  as  well:  economies  of  scale  in  waste 
management do not exert potential impacts in densely urbanised areas. This result confirms the
major findings in the literature. 
In terms of landfill diversion dynamics, the observed decoupling between economic growth and 
landfilling  was expected,  but  is  probably  not  sufficient  per  se  if  waste  generation  (the  scale) 
continues  to  increase:  it is  driven  by  a  mix  of  economic-structural  factors,  such  as  population 
density, which here is weighted more heavily than mere income: local opportunity costs and landfill 
externalities, which are higher in heavily populated areas, matter in shaping waste policies and local 
commitment  to  landfill  diversion.  This  may  be  food  for  though  for  regional  and  development 
policies at local level and useful insight for assessments of the income-environment relationship.
Income plays a role in driving different regional waste performance, but rather indirectly, although 
opportunity costs have a more direct effect through their income dynamics, such as in the simplistic 
interpretation of the income-environment relationship.
It  is  not  only  structural  factors  that  are  relevant.  Although  landfill  tax  is  not  shown  to  be  a 
significant driver of the phenomenon, as in other EU countries (policy package may matter more)
the set of waste management instruments, such as separated collection, and the accompanying tariff-
based  evolution  of  local  waste  services, implemented  both  within  privatised  and  public  owned 
utilities, are associated with a significant negative effect on landfilled waste. It is worth noting that, 
as far as waste management is concerned, robust evidence of ‘policy endogeneity’ is found: the 
dynamics is one where richer provinces (income drivers local preferences for green public goods, 
local authorities receive more taxes to fund such goods) implement stricter and more costly waste 
management systems, that have (so far) not generated absolute delinking, but are aimed at that and 30
could soon revert the waste-income relationships. Such endogenous dynamics are of high interest in 
contexts where the central state fully delegates all the management to local levels of governance.
Given the strong north-south heterogeneity, the endogeneity of waste management commitment 
and  the  transition  towards  highly  decentralised  policy  implementation,  we  analysed  spatial 
dependence  regarding provinces,  the  effective  level  of  waste  management  decision  making.
Landfilled waste data do not present evidence of spatial autocorrelation. In addition, if there were 
any spatial phenomena regarding waste performance, they disappeared during the transition since 
2000 to a new waste management system. Thus, it is reasonable also to argue that neighbouring 
provinces  are  unlikely  to  exchange  experience,  and  thus  also  unlikely  to  influence  each  others’ 
policies and waste landfill habits. This substantial lack of the spatial autocorrelation might be due to 
the fact that, as acknowledged by experts and anecdotal evidence, the definition and implementation 
of landfill policy effectively has happened at a very sub-provincial decentralised (even municipal) 
level. However, we can draw a different conclusion based on the spatial analysis of waste generation. 
Starting  from  an  initial  situation  with  a  significant  and  positive  spatial  dependence  before  the 
effective introduction of economic based management instruments, the years after 2000 show a 
substantial  absence  of  spatial  autocorrelation  for  landfilled  waste,  which  could  be  related  to  a 
spatially progressive homogenisation in per capita waste generation, and no clustering at regional or 
interregional levels. The stronger association of waste generation and income levers, and the lower, 
with respect to landfilling, effect of waste management instruments and local opportunity costs, 
might explain this result.
Another conclusion  relevant  to  environmental  policy  making, is related  to  the  possible  (huge) 
difference between a country’s average performance and its negative and positive outliers, a situation 
that may  be  exacerbated  by  environmental externalities  tackled  through  a  very  high  policy  and 
management decentralisation. The  evidence  provided  in  this  paper  would  seem  to  suggest  that 
divergence is a risk and a possibility that we need to tackle: accompanying the lack of economic 
convergence  experienced  by  Italy  over  recent  decades,  there  is  an income-driven  divergence in 31
socio-economic and institutional performance. The introduction and the enforcement of ‘new’ waste 
management  options  (tariffs,  separated  collection)  are  stronger  and  more  concentrated  in  the 
northern regions.  The  southern  and  northern  regions  are  characterised by  vicious  and  virtuous 
circles  related  respectively  to  income  and  waste  policy  implementation.  The  risk  of  overall 
divergence is evident: this could lead to more and more frequent local crises related to waste, which 
would undermine national performance and require national intervention in terms of financing, as  
the  costs  of  cleaning  up  would  be  beyond  the  individual  regions  ‘responsible’  for  this  dire 
performance.  
Though our analysis finally shows that there is some convergence in action for both waste 
generation and landfill diversion (the latter a more positive fact) along this dynamic evolutionary 
process, attention should be paid in managing such a highly decentralised process of managing 
waste. If its is true that the process of landfill diversion seems occurring in a scenario in which the 
relatively less performing provinces (in the South) have started to reduce the gap (with the North), 
and this represents a small light at the end of the tunnel, which should be taken as a stimulus to a 
further  strengthening  of  regional  convergence,  notwithstanding  structural  socio-economic 
differences that explain different levels of waste performance, but along a converging path, on the 
other hand in terms of waste generation this confirms previous results. Environmental policies have 
not been able to promote a reduction in the amount of waste generated, and those provinces that 
were less waste-intensive, since 2000 have registered even higher growth rate. 
Finally, we could say that this is partly an old tale: although policy decentralisation is preferable in 
theory, given that it may ensure higher coherence with the local preferences for defined public 
goods and the fact that different regions are experiencing different stages of economic development, 
the basic and  we think  misleading interpretation  of  environmental Kuznets  curves  that income 
drives environmental performance, does not take account of the fact that along these dynamics 
income, from social, economic and political perspectives, helps the financing and enforcement of 
stronger and better environmental management and policy efforts. This is a possible drawback of a 32
strongly  decentralised  policy  process  and  should  provide  food  for  thought  in  terms  of  future 
research, and future policy in the EU and US and countries in the initial phases of waste policy 
efforts.     33
APPENDIX:
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CONSTANT 3.988506*** 2.620096*** 2.713269*** 9.425374*** 0.6674112*** 0.9528525 8.875068*** 0.3411253 0.4274984
VA 0.1981252*** 0.1649368** 0.4169227*** 0.3955181*** 0.4292366*** 0.422698***
DENSITY 0.4027496*** 0.314313*** 0.3484448*** -0.6357739*** 0.2926517*** 0.2769891*** -0.5275321** 0.3332481*** 0.3286678***
SEP-COLLECT 0.0701332*** 0.0303273***  0.0492306***
TAR-POP^ 0.007308*** 0.0003701**  0.0006074***
TAR-MUN^ 0.011831*** 0.0001507  0.0002543
Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.





Using the first 
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Using the first 





CONSTANT 4437.886*** 4021.835*** 4196.6*** 1061.97 7638.628*** 7250.425 3576.104*** 7041.181*** 5764.787***
VA -408.9492*** -379.8387*** -394.9188*** -298.2929*
DENSITY -778.8923*** -708.3027*** -734.2649*** -134.0417 -646.2248*** -624.9235*** -630.0055*** -555.3378*** -487.6524***
SEP-COLLECT -43.5478*** -24.35552*** -38.36197**
TAR-POP^ -4.537735*** -0.5033163 -0.8260642*
TAR-MUN^ -2.243737*** -2.227458***
(1) -3.758221***
Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. R2 presents reasonably high value for panel settings. ^ Variables not in Log format.34
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i Although northern Italy is rapidly evolving towards high levels of recycling, composting and incineration, the average 
for the country is still dominated by landfill, confirmed by the dramatic news from areas, such as Campania, in the 
South. However, even some northern regions are suffering from landfill criticalities given the increasing scarcity of land 
in physical and economic terms (opportunity costs) and the non-decreasing, at best stabilised trends in waste generation. 
Figures  3  and 4 depict  the  current  differences  in  waste  management  and  disposal  across  Italian  provinces (other
depictions are  available upon  requests for incineration  and  waste  generation  and  tariff  diffusions).  For  a  ‘regional 
politics’ oriented analysis of the recent history of the economic and institutional failures in the Neapolitan and Sicilian 
waste systems see Pasotti (2009a,b).
ii Our data source, to our knowledge, is one of the richest - at least at EU level and the Italian case presents high 
heterogeneous (and federal) socio-economic and policy situations similar to other EU and non-EU countries.
iii The waste management tariff was introduced by Italian law no. 22/1997, and was meant to replace the former waste 
management tax; however, the latter still applies in many Italian municipalities because the provisions of law 22/1997 
allow the transition to be quite gradual. The old tax was calculated on the basis of size of household living space, 
whereas the tariff is based on the principles of full-cost pricing of waste management services. Effective implementation 
of the tariff system nevertheless is highly dependent on local policy decisions and practices and in part is down to the 
choice of the municipality. We note that implementation is heterogeneous even across areas with similar incomes and 
similar social economic variables, and may depend on the level of policy commitment. The shift from tax to tariff should 
also capture the incentive effect of the latter, although the impact on waste generation, if any, is not visible in the short
term.
iv This is coherent with EU environmental policies, which, in theory, should be rooted firmly in the polluter pays 
principle. It should be noted that the European court of Justice has been forced to pronounce a legal decision statement 
(probably during 2009) on the coherence of such a tax with the PPP, following a legal procedure activated by a hotel 
owner who sued against the tax through the administrative court of the Campania Region (‘TAR’), claiming that that tax 
was/is  based  and  calculated  on  parameters such  as  square  meters, but  also  business  income.  Legally  and  also 
substantially,  the  problem  is  one of whether  the  old  tax  can  achieve  the  objectives  determined  by  the  EU  waste 
legislation. An EU decision in favour of full coherence with PPP could accelerate the transition towards the tariff, which 
was been halted repeatedly on the basis of unclear instruction from central government in recent years. Note also that 
many municipalities are not in favour of the new tariff, fearing loss of revenue. This is critical to a clear understanding of
the current stalled situation. 
v It is well known that this flaw may depend on the availability of average instead of marginal policy figures.
vi As far as landfill diversion is concerned, and considering that the dataset presents some zero values (5 of the 103 
provinces observed in 1999-2006 have no MSW landfill sites and others, e.g. Milan, closed their landfill sites at a certain 
point resulting in zero values after a certain year) the model specification is of a linear-log type. Further analyses may 
implement two stage Heckman regressions to account for the discrete choice of having (or not) a landfill facility, and for 
how much waste is to be landfilled. 
vii We  use  Stata,  specifically  the  option  ‘cluster’  after  the  ‘FE LSDV  estimation’.  In  this  way  we  use  the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance and we allow observations that are not time invariant within groups, 
although they  must be independent between groups. This means that we consider that Var(εit) = σ2εit i=1,.., N, 
t=1,…,T, and that Cov(εit, εis) ≠ 0    t ≠ s.
viii Non-corrected estimates are available; note that they differ very little, apart from the non-linearity of the income-
environment relationship which disappears when corrected. The results are coherent.
ix A non-linear specification (not shown) was tested, but the squared VA term was never significant. 
x We also test for geographical dummies, inserting North, South, Island dummies against the ‘centre of Italy’ benchmark. 
The only significant dummies are North and South, which both have a negative coefficient. While we might expect this 
for the North, the evidence for the South dummy is less intuitive given the high frequency of poor waste performance in 
southern regions. Note, however, that here we deal with waste  generation, not management. Also, the evidence is 
coherent with APAT data, which show that the centre regions (especially the touristic Tuscany) are associated with the 
highest levels of waste generation per capita.  
xi This may be scope for further research.
xii Overall, TAR-POP is more significant than TAR-MUN. This could mean a higher impact at provincial level of new 
policy diffusion in terms of population, rather than municipalities. What matters is its implementation in the largest cities 
where incomes are probably higher on average, evoking the latent endogeneity of the dynamics.  
xiiiElasticity estimates deriving from the log-log estimations (not shown for reasons of space) covering provinces with at 
least one open landfill, are available upon request. 
xiv The highly significant role of density as a covariate, improving the overall fit of the model, is underlined in the UK 
study by Ham (2009).
xv Interviews with waste experts in some of the Italian regions confirmed that the tax is aimed mainly at collecting 
revenue (and eventually earmarking it for waste services and landfill sites ex post re-qualification), not at changing 
relative prices. However, some regions have not implemented strategies for its prioritisation and use the revenue to
finance other public services. This is of major concern in terms of improving the effectiveness of this instrument in the 38
                                                                                                                                                         
future through greater enforcement and the introduction of real ‘revenue recycling’ elements into the system. Finally, 
landfill sites operate in a very monopolistic kind of market, where associated rents (deriving from gate fees and rather
inelastic demand) are a real constraint to a major movement of waste from landfill. 
xvi Formally,  spatial  autocorrelation  is  present  when  spatial  randomness  is  violated.  Generally,  we  have  spatial 
randomness when:
 values observed at a location do not depend on the values observed at neighbouring locations; 
 the observed spatial pattern of values is equally as likely as any other spatial pattern; 
the location of values may be altered without affecting the information content of the data.
xvii The global Moran’s I provides a global autocorrelation statistic that result in a single measure of spatial autocorrelation 
for an attribute in a region as a whole (in our case, Italy). The local Moran’s I provides local spatial autocorrelation 
statistics, which, for each unit in the region (in our case a single province), result in the unit's tendency for an attribute 
value that is correlated with the values in nearby areas. In our analysis we are interested in the global measure. However 
the LISA cluster maps (figures 5 and 6) show evidence for the local (provincial) indicators.
xviii Even when the weights are based on simple contiguity, different weights structures may result for the same spatial 
layout. The options are referred to as the rook case (only common boundaries), the bishop case (only common vertices) 
and the queen case (both boundaries and vertices). In our case, with Italian provincial boundaries, the queen and the rook 
methods end up with the same weight matrix.
xix The neighbours are contiguous spatial units. For ease of interpretation and to make the parameter estimates between 
different models more comparable, the spatial weights matrix is typically row-standardised.
xx When the same variables are used to compute a general distance metric such as included in the model, the weights are 
unlikely  to  remain  exogenous.  Consequently,  the  resulting  model  specification  becomes  highly  non-linear  with 
endogeneity that must be instrumented out.
xxi The transition towards the tariff formally began with the 1999 EU landfill Directive (ratified by Italy in 2003).
xxii A Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity for a fixed effects panel data model was conducted to check whether an 
OLS estimator for the same equation would yield consistent estimates.NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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